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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAMIE MEDVED,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

])

CaseNo.20030338-CA

])

Trial Court No. 010400960

vs.
C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D. AND ESTATE ;
BLAYNE L. HIRSCHE, M.D.
;
Defendants and Appellees.

]

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2-2(f)(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues on appeal relate to the District Court's granting of Defendants9 Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint:
1.

Is the loss of Plaintiff s breast due to Defendants' negligent failure to

diagnose cancer, a legally cognizable injury?
2.

Is the loss of a breast an actual injury under Utah law?

3.

Does a Plaintiff who has had more extensive surgery as a result of

Defendants' negligence have to wait until she has a recurrence of cancer to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted?

1

4.

Did the District Court error in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint because she

lost her breasts, but did not have a recurrence of cancer?
On review of a grant of a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint under 12(b)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Complaint is entitled to the benefit of not only all
allegations of the Complaint, but also from the inferences in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff. Ellis v. Social Service of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 615
P.2d 1250 (Ut. 1980); Mountaineer v. Utah Power & Light 823 P.2d 1055 (Ut. 1991).
The allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint are deemed to be true. Brown v. Weis 871 P.2d
552 (Ut. 1994).
Disposition In Lower Court
1.

On November 20, 2002, oral arguments were heard on Defendants' Joint

Motion for Dismissal Without Prejudice.
2.

On November 26, 2002, the Court was advised that Blayne Hirsche, M.D.

had died in a plane accident. On December 10, 2002, pursuant to Stipulation, the Estate
of Blayne Hirsche was substituted as a party Defendant.
3.

On March 19, 2003, the Court granted Defendants' Joint Motion.

4.

Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on April 8, 2003.

5.

Plaintiffs Docketing Statement was filed on April 28, 2003.

2

DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
The interpretation of the following statutes and case law are involved in this
appeal:
1.

George v. LDS Hospital, 797 2d 1117 (Ut App. 1990)

2.

Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Ut. 1996)

3.

Restatement of Torts, §323.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
On December 28, 1998, Plaintiff underwent a right radical mastectomy as a

result of Defendants9 negligent failure to timely diagnose breast cancer. Plaintiff later
had chemotherapy and radiation as well as a surgical reconstruction of her breast.
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' negligence, her diagnosis was
delayed resulting in her having a mastectomy, intensive chemo and radiation therapies
and subsequent reconstruction of her breast. Plaintiff also remains at an unnecessarily
high risk of recurrence. Plaintiff alleged that had the diagnosis been made timely, she
would not have had the extensive surgery and resulting reconstruction of her breast.
B.

Statement of Facts

The following facts are admitted by the parties or not in material dispute:
1.

Plaintiff first saw Dr. Glenn as a patient in 1991.

2.

Plaintiffs last visit with Dr. Glenn was February 27, 1998.
3

3.

During the time Plaintiff was Dr. Glenn's patient, she was diagnosed with

fibrocystic breast disease.
4.

Plaintiff first saw Dr. Hirsche as a patient on July 13, 1998.

5.

A mammogram, ordered by Dr. Hirsche and performed on July 20, 1998,

revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally.
6.

On August 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed bilateral breast augmentation

and aspiration of three suspected right breast cysts.
7.

On December 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of

three right breast nodules.
8.

The pathological examination associated with the December 12, 1998,

excisional biopsy revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating ductal carcinoma.
9.

On December 28, 1998, Steven J. Mintz, M.D. performed a right modified

radical mastectomy.
10.

Plaintiff followed her surgical treatment with chemotherapy and radiation

therapy and later had surgical reconstruction.
11.

Plaintiff has not had a recurrence of her cancer.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court failed to follow Utah law and incorrectly granted Defendants'
Joint Motion to Dismiss.
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Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Defendants negligently delayed diagnosis of her
cancer and, as a result, Plaintiff (a) sustained actual damages by undergoing more
extensive treatment and surgery, including a radical mastectomy and (b) has an increased
risk of recurrence.
Utah has recognized that liability may be imposed where negligence increases a
party's risk of harm in George v. IDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990). In
Seale v. Gowans 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), that right was limited to cases where the
increased risk of harm is accompanied by actual damages.
Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint, (which under a motion to dismiss are deemed to
be true), that she sustained actual damages as well as an increased risk of recurrence.
Plaintiff has, therefore, stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS9 MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS PLED THAT AS A RESULT OF
DEFENDANTS' DELAY IN DIAGNOSIS, SHE SUSTAINED
ACTUAL DAMAGES AND HAS AN INCREASED RISK OF
CANCER RECURRENCE.
A.

In A Motion To Dismiss, All Of Plaintiff s Allegations In Her
Complaint Are Deemed To Be True.

On a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint under 12(b)(6), of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Complaint is entitled to the benefit of not only all allegations in the
Complaint, but also from the inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Ellis v.
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Social Services of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah
1980), Mountaineer v. Utah Power & Light Co. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). The
allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint are deemed to be true. Brown v Weis 871 P.2d 552
(Utah 1994).
B.

Plaintiff Has Pled That She Sustained Actual
Damages And Has An Increased Risk of
Recurrence of Cancer As A Result of Defendants'
Delay In Diagnosis.

Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' delay in diagnosis that
she sustained actual damages as a result of the Defendants' negligence:
13.
On December 16, 19985 the biopsies were carried out
by Dr. Hirsche. These revealed infiltrating ductile carcinoma
at all three sites. In late December of 1998, Ms. Medved
underwent a right mastectomy. Since the tumor involved
eight lymph nodes, it was also necessary to have the lymph
nodes removed. She also underwent chemotherapy and
radiation therapy after the surgery.
* * #

17.
As a proximate result of the above-described
negligence of Dr. Glenn, Jamie Medved's diagnosis of her
breast cancer was delayed resulting in her having to undergo
a mastectomy and axillary node dissection, intensive
chemotherapy and radiation therapy and she remains at a very
high risk of recurrence, has endured pain and suffering,
disfigurement loss of enjoyment of life and, other general
damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
18.
As a proximate result of the above-described
negligence of Dr. Glenn, Plaintiff has incurred medical
expenses, and, will undoubtedly incur future medical
6

expenses and, other special damages including, but not
limited to loss of income and loss of economic opportunities,
in an amount to be proven at trial.
Since the allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint are deemed to be true, the issue is
whether the Defendants5 failure to timely diagnose breast cancer which results in a right
radical mastectomy and produces an increased risk of the recurrence of cancer, states a
claim for relief under Utah law.
C.

Actual Damages In Conjunction With An Increased
Risk of Cancer Recurrence Is Sufficient To Sustain
A Claim For Negligence,

In addition to actual damages, (radical mastectomy), Plaintiff has alleged that she
has an increased risk of recurrence of cancer. In George v. IDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117
(Utah App. 1990), the court recognized a claim for loss of chance. It cited with approval
James v. United States 483 F.Supp. 581, 585 (N.D.C.A. 1980):
"Evidence which shows a reasonable certainty that negligent
delay in diagnosis or treatment increased or lessened the
effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to establish proximate
cause." Id. at 585.
The Court also approved Hicks v. United States 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) and
its conclusion that Defendant's "negligence nullified whatever chance of recovery she
might have had and was the proximate cause of the death." Id. at 633. The court in
George, supra, similarly cited with approval Goffv. Doctors General Hospital of San
Jose 333 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1958) (where the "chance of saving a patient's life would have
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been increased if a physician had been timely notified" and whether this negligence was a
cause of death was a jury question.) Hamilv. Bashline 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978) and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323'
In George, the Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the hospital.
Following a jury verdict in favor of the hospital, the Supreme Court reversed for new
trial. The Court found that a jury could have reasonably concluded that the hospital's
negligence prevented doctors from treating and possibly saving patients' life but that the
jury instructions prevented it from meaningfully considering the expert testimony.
Under George v. LDS Hospital, supra., then, a party is subject to liability if his
negligent conduct increases the risk of harm, lessens the effectiveness of treatment or
decreases a chance of survival. Id. at 1117.
In Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court
conditioned that right of recovery to cases where the Plaintiff presents proof of actual
damages. It did not abolish the claim for enhanced risk or overturn the ruling in George
v. LDS Hospital, supra. In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants cite, the following
language from Seale: ...[A]n alleged claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a
cause of action for negligence." (Defendants' Memorandum in Support at p.4.) The
complete quotation is, in fact:

'"One who undertakes... to render services to another...is subject to liability... if (a) his
failure to exercise [reasonable] care increases the risk of such harm."
8

Although we agree that the cancers spread resulted in a
dramatic decrease in Ms. Seale's chance of survival, we
concluded that without proof of actual damages, an alleged
claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of
action for negligence. (Emphasis added.)
The Court in Seale discussed Colbert v. Georgetown Univ. 641 A.2d 469 (D.C.
1994), and Swain v. Curry 595 So.2d 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1992), where risk of recurrence
of cancer was approved, as a basis of liability. The Utah Supreme Court found that:
In these cases [Colbert and Swain] the evidence
showed that the Plaintiffs had suffered actual damages in
conjunction with the increased risk of the cancers recurrence."
Id. at 1366.
The Court distinguished those cases from Ms. Seale's who did not allege she had
actual damages as a result of the delay in diagnosis. Seale had a mastectomy and more
extensive surgery in 1988, but did not sue until 1991. She did not allege the 1988 actual
damages (mastectomy) in her 1991 suit because she was barred by the statute of
limitations from such assertion. She, therefore, sued only for the risk of recurrence of
cancer.
The issue in Seale was whether that claim was barred by the statute of limitations,
Ms. Seale went to Dr. Gowans for a mammogram in August 1987. Dr. Gowans failed to
detect a cancerous mass in Ms. Seale's breast. The mass was not discovered until May,
1988. Ms. Seale had a radical mastectomy a short time later. The pathology report of the
removed tissue showed that the cancer had spread to eight of Ms. Seale's twenty lymph
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nodes. Although Ms. Seale was told that the finding of cancer in her lymph nodes
increases the possibility that cancer would recur in other parts of her body, Ms. Seale did
not bring an action against Dr. Gowans at that time.
Ms. Seale tested negative for cancer until August 1991, when a bone scan showed
cancer in her hip. Ms. Seale then brought an action against Dr. Gowans for negligent
delay in diagnosing her cancer. Based on the jury's finding that Ms. Seale discovered or
should have discovered her injury in June 1988, when she was correctly diagnosed with
breast cancer, the trial court held that Ms. Seale's action was barred by the medical
malpractice act's two-year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. The Utah
Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the particular facts of the case, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until the cancer returned in Ms. Seale's hip.
Dr. Gowans argued that the injury that triggered the running of the statute of
limitations was the cancer's spread to Ms. Seale's lymph nodes, "which statistically
increased the chance that cancer would recur and thus decreased her chance of long-term
survival." 923 P.2d at 1364 (footnote omitted). The court held that "damages in the form
of an enhanced risk only are not sufficient to start the running of the statute of
limitations." Id, at 1365 (emphasis added). The court noted the general rule that, until a
plaintiff suffers "actual harm or damages, the limitations period will not accrue." Id. at
1364. The court emphasized that the defendant had the burden of proving that the

10

plaintiff had suffered some "actual harm or damages" before August 1989 and concluded
that the defendant had not met his burden:
[Defendants failed to prove that Ms. Seale suffered a legally
cognizable injury when she discovered that the cancer had
spread to her lymph nodes. The only evidence that
defendants produced regarding the harmful consequence of
the cancer's spread was that it increased the risk that the
cancer would recur. They failed to argue or produce evidence
that in 1988, Ms, Seale could complain of any actual present
damages. Although we agree that the cancer's spread resulted
in a dramatic decrease in Ms. Seale's chance of survival, we
conclude that without proof of actual damages, an alleged
claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of
action for negligence. ...

Because the only evidence defendants presented at trial, and
the only evidence Ms. Seale could marshal, showed that Ms.
Seale could not have discovered any legally cognizable injury
until 1991, we find that the evidence was insufficient for a
jury to find that Ms. Seale discovered her injury in 1988.
Id. at 1364-65, 1366 (emphasis added).
In other words, the holding in Seale was based upon the parties' arguments and the
evidence at trial that the only injury Ms. Seale suffered as a result of Dr. Gowans'
negligence before her cancer recurred in 1991 was the possibility that her cancer would
recur. The court found this a legally insufficient injury, absent some "actual harm or
damages." See Id. at 1364. See also Id. ("once some harm is manifest, the limitations
period begins to run on all claims") (emphasis added and citation omitted).
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The Court did not rule or hold that Ms. Seale could not have sued in 1988 for
actual damages or that she could not recover for enhanced risk or loss of chance. The
Court only held that without actual damages, which were not alleged or sought, she could
not have filed suit in 1988 for loss of chance.
By contrast, Mrs. Medved has alleged "actual harm or damages" resulting from
Defendants5 negligence, as well as the enhanced risk that her cancer will recur. As
previously discussed, those allegations are assumed to be true in a Motion to Dismiss.
Specifically, Mrs. Medved has alleged that, but for Defendants5 negligence, she would
not have required a modified radical mastectomy, and she would not have undergone the
cost of more extensive therapy, which caused her pain, suffering and inconvenience.
II.

TO THE EXTENT DEFENDANTS' MOTION IS DEEMED A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT SHOULD ALSO HAVE
BEEN DENIED.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the undisputed material facts
demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Territorial
Sav. & Loan v. Baird 781 P.2d 452 (Utah 1989.) Even if the District Court found that
under Seale v. Gowans Plaintiff cannot recover for loss of chance (increased risk of
cancer), the Court could not have ruled that Plaintiff is barred from recovery for the actual
damages she has already sustained. If Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is considered a
Motion for Summary Judgment, (i.e., that as a matter of law, Plaintiff is not entitled to
relief for her claim,) it should also be denied.
12

As a matter of law. Plaintiff has made a claim for relief which is legally
cognizable. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' delay in
diagnosis, she underwent more extensive surgery and treatment and has an increased risk
of recurrence of cancer.
As discussed above, a Plaintiff who alleges she has sustained actual damages in
conjunction with an increased risk of recurrence of cancer, has made a legally cognizable
claim under Utah law. George v. LDSHospital, supra., and Seale v. Gowans, supra. As
a matter of law, Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted and, thus, is
entitled to relief for that claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that she sustained actual damages as a result of
Defendants' delay in diagnosing her cancer. She is, therefore, entitled to all damages she
has sustained, including all foreseeable consequences and those within reasonable
medical certainty, caused by Defendants' negligence. Under Utah law, those
consequences include the increased risk of harm caused by Defendants.
Dated this ( 3 day of November, 2003.
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN rv

J^m^AV. Uilson / /
/Attorneys for Plamtiff/Appellant, Jamie
j Medved
/
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Michael F. Richman [#4180]
Barbara L. Townsend [#5568] ~ ^
MICHAEL F. RICHMAN & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
5684 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 266-5572
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAIME MEDVED,
Plaintiff,

]
)>
i

C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D. AND BLAYNE ]
L. fflRSCHE, M.D.
]
I
Defendant.
I

COMPLAINT
(Demand for Jury Trial)

Civil No. 6l0*te%}0
Judge:

^

Plaintiff, Jaime Medved, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby complains of
the Defendants C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. and Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D., and for cause of action
alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

For all causes of action hereinafter stated, Plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of this

court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953, as amended).

i

2.

Defendant, C. Joseph Glenn, M.D., is a resident of Utah County, with his

principal place of business in Utah County, state of Utah. The venue of this Court is therefore
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7 (1953, as amended).
3.

Defendant, Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D., is a resident of Utah County, with his

principal place of business in Utah County, state of Utah. The venue of this Court is therefore
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7 (1953, as amended).
4.

Plaintiff, Jaime Medved, is a resident of Utah County, state of Utah.

5.

Plaintiff has complied with all required conditions precedent with respect to the

service of a Notice of Intent to Commence Action and with respect to participation in a Panel
Review of alleged medical malpractice involving the Defendants, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-14-1, et seq. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to bring this action.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
6.

The Plaintiff, Jaime Medved, had been seeing Dr. Glenn as her OB/Gyn

physician. In August of 1997, she saw Dr. Glenn complaining of a lump in her right breast. Dr.
Glenn noted that she had a 2 millimeter superficial lump in her right breast along with fibrocystic
changes of both breasts. He told the patient to check herself and to follow-up if she determined
that the tumor had changed.
7.

Based upon Dr. Glenn's reassurance, Ms. Medved did not return to see him until

February 27,1998. Dr. Glenn noted fibrocystic changes, asymmetrical, right much greater than
left and tender. He indicated that he would refer Ms. Medved to Dr. Fullmer, if the lump did not

2

go down following her next menstrual cycle, but he failed to schedule any follow-up and failed to
order a mammogram.
8.

On July 13,1998, Ms. Medved saw Dr. Blayne Hirsche, a plastic surgeon, to have

the lumps removed and also to ask him about breast augmentation. Dr. Hirsche identified
"numerous cysts" of the right breast. Dr. Hirsche recommended a mammogram and then
proceeded with breast augmentation and aspiration of the cysts at the time of surgery.
9.

On July 20,1998, Ms. Medved obtained a mammogram and the report noted

dense fibroglandular breast tissue bilaterally. The report further stated that there was no evidence
of malignancy, however, the breast is heterogeneously dense. This may lower sensitivity of
mammography.
10.

Dr. Hirsche performed surgery on August 12,1998 for breast augmentation.

During that surgery, he used an 18 gauge needle to aspirate the three cystic areas. He noted that
all three were aspirated with only a small amount of fluid being obtained. The areas appeared to
be solid. No biopsy was done nor was the fluid sent for pathology.
11.

In a post-operative visit on August 14,1998, Dr. Hirsche discussed with Ms.

Medved the need to have the breast lesions removed and that the procedure could be set up in
approximately four to five weeks.
12.

On September 18,1998, Dr. Hirsche again saw Ms. Medved and noted that the

cysts in the right breast were decreasing in size but were still tender, sore and enlarged. He
recommended evaluating them again in three months. On December 14,1998, Dr. Hirsche
examined Ms. Medved and recommended excisional biopsy of the breast lesions.
3

13.

On December 16, 1998, the biopsies were carried out by Dr. Hirsche. These

revealed infiltrating ductile carcinoma at all three sites. In late December of 1998, Ms. Medved
underwent a right mastectomy. Since the tumor involved eight lymph nodes, it was also
necessary to have the lymph nodes removed. She also underwent chemotherapy and radiation
therapy after the surgery.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D.)
14.

Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1

through 13, above.
15.

The Defendant, Dr. Glenn, owed a duty of care to Jaime Medved which required

him to act reasonably and in a careful and prudent manner in providing medical care and
attention to Ms. Medved.
16.

The Defendant, Dr. Glenn, was negligent and breached his duty of care to Jaime

Medved. Dr. Glenn's negligence includes, but is not limited to the following acts and/or
omissions:
a)

Defendant, Dr. Glenn, evaluated Jaime Medved, noted that she had lumps

in her breast, but failed to have her follow-up appropriately with him for further screening;
b)

Defendant, Dr. Glenn, failed to obtain a mammogram;

c)

Defendant, Dr. Glenn, negligently recommended that the patient herself

determine whether the lumps were enlarging or not;
d)

Any other negligent acts or omissions which discovery may reveal.
4
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17.

As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of Dr. Glenn, Jaime

Medved's diagnosis of her breast cancer was delayed resulting in her having to undergo a
mastectomy and axillary node dissection, intensive chemotherapy and radiation therapy and she
remains at a very high risk of recurrence, has endured pain and suffering, disfigurement, loss of
enjoyment of life and, other general damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
18.

As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of Dr. Glenn, Plaintiff

has incurred medical expenses, and, will undoubtedly incur future medical expenses and, other
special damages including, but not limited to loss of income and loss of economic opportunities,
in an amount to be proven at trial.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT, BLAYNE L. HIRSCHE, M.D.)
19.

Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein the allegations of 1 through 13, above.

20.

The Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, owed a duty of care to Jaime Medved which required

him to act reasonably and in a careful and prudent manner in providing medical care and
attention to Jaime Medved.
21.

The Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, was negligent and breached his duty of care to Jaime

Medved. Dr. Hirsche's negligence includes, but is not limited to, the following acts and
omissions:
a)

Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, failed to remove the breast tumors at the time he

did surgery and when he discovered that he was dealing with a solid mass and not a cyst;
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b)

Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, negligently went ahead with the breast

augmentation surgery which further delayed diagnosis of cancer;
c)

Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, misdiagnosed Ms. Medved's serious condition;

d)

Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, failed to provide adequate diagnostic tests and

follow-up treatment; and
e)
22.

Any other negligent acts or omissions which discovery may reveal.

As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of Dr. Hirsche, Jaime

Medved's diagnosis of her breast cancer was delayed resulting in her having to undergo a
mastectomy and axillary node dissection, intensive chemotherapy and radiation therapy and she
remains at a very high risk of recurrence, has endured pain and suffering, disfigurement, loss of
enjoyment of life and, other general damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
23.

As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of Dr. Glenn. Plaintiff

has incurred medical expenses, and, will undoubtedly incur future medical expenses and, other
special damages including, but not limited to loss of income and loss of economic opportunities,
in an amount to be proven at trial.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief against the Defendants, and each of them, as
follows:
A,

For general damages, including but not limited to damages for pain and suffering,

loss of enjoyment of life in amounts as may be proven at trial;
B.

For medical expenses both past and future in an amount to be proven at trial;
6

C.

For lost wages and economic opportunities in an amount to be proven at trial;

D.

For costs and expenses incurred in this proceeding; and

E.

For interest on all special damages and for other such and further relief as this

Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff requests a triakby jury and has enclosed the statutory fee herewith.
DATED this 2 $ day of February, 2001.
MICHAEL F. RICHMAN & ASSOCIATES

Plaintiffs Address:
490 South 1100 West
Orem, UT 84058
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PROVO DEPARTMENT

2002 AUG - 2 pS\>. ^-,
Dennis C. Ferguson [A1061]
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
Fax: (801)364-4500
Attorneys for Defendant
Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D.
Curtis J. Drake [A0910]
Anne D. Armstrong [A8886]
SNELL & WILMER, LLP
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant
C. Joseph Glenn, M.D.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMIE MEDVED,
Plaintiff,
v.
C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D., and BLAYNE
L. HIRSCHE, M.D.,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION
FOR DISMISSAL
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Case No. 010400960
Division 9
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendants Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D. ("Dr. Hirsche") and C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. ("Dr.
Glenn") (collectively "Defendants"), hereby move the Court for an order dismissing without
prejudice plaintiffs Complaint and legal action. The basis for this motion is that plaintiffs legal

SMITHMS\SLC\216787.3

action, if she ever has one, has not accrued under the legal doctrine established in Seale v.
Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996).
Plaintiffs complaint against Defendants includes allegations of negligence in failing to
timely diagnose her breast cancer. Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result of the alleged delay in
diagnosis, the likelihood of a recurrence is greater and her prognosis is therefore worse than
would have been the case with an earlier diagnosis. Under the holding of Seale, supra, however,
unless there is a recurrence of cancer, no legally cognizable injury exists and no cause of action
has arisen. Plaintiff has not suffered a recurrence of cancer. Plaintiffs cause of action
therefore, has not accrued and the Complaint should be dismissed. This motion is supported by a
legal memorandum submitted contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this %Q day of TAJLIU
Au

,, 2002.
LIAMS & HUNT

IIAAJ
Denllis C. Ferguson
Attorneys for Defendant
Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D.

SNELL & WlLMER

Curtis J. Drake
Anne D. Armstrong
Attorneys for Defendant
C. Joseph Glenn, M.D.

SMITHMS\SLC\216787.3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, first-class,
postage prepaid, on the j ? 0

da

Y of _ ^ k = l _ > 2 0 0 2 1 0

*f

Michael F. Richman, Esq.
James W. Gilson, Esq.
MICHAEL F. RICHMAN & ASSOCIATES
5664 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
\
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Michael F. Richman [#4180]
James W.Gilson [#1170]
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5664 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 266-0999
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMIE MEDVED,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]1
)
])
>
)

C.JOSEPH GLENN, MJ). AND BLAYNE j)
L. HIRSCHE, M.D.
;i
Defendants.

i

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTICtf
FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

Case No.: 010400960
Division: 9
Judge: Fred D. Howard

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Jamie Medved by and through her counsel of record, hereby submit the
following in response and opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion for Dismissal Without
Prejudice.
Defendants' motion should be denied because Plaintiff has pled that she sustained actual
damages as a result of Defendants' failure to timely diagnose her cancer. Specifically, plaintiffs
Complaint alleges actual damages in conjunction with an increased risk of recurrence of cancer.
She has, therefore, stated a doim upon winch tvlic/f ran he granted under I hull \i\\\ flporge v.

1
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LDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990) ("Liability may be found where negligence
increases a party's risk of harm.") Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323) Seale v. Gowans 923
P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996) ("Actual damages in conjunction with the cancer's recurrence" is a
cognizable claim.)
DEFENDANTS* MOTION TO DTSMTSS
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Defendant's negligently delayed diagnosis of her cancer
and as a result, Plaintiff (a) sustained actual damages by undergoing more extensive treatment
and surgery, including a radical mastectomy and (b) has an increased risk of recurrence.
Defendants' move to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that unless there is a
recurrence of cancer, Plaintiff has not sustained a legally cognizable injury. Since Plaintiff has
not had a recurrence, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed,
(Defendants' Memorandum in Support Of Motion to Dismiss at p.2.)

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION
Utah has recognized that liability may be imposed where negligence increases a party's
risk of harm in George v. LDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990). In Seale v. Gowans
923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), that right was limited to cases where the increased risk of harm is
accompanied by actual damages.
Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint, (which under a motion to dismiss are deemed to be
true), that she sustained actual damages as well as an increased risk of recurrence. Plaintiff has
therefore stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2

I.

DEFEND ANTS* MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF HAS PLED THAT AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANTS5 DELAY IN
DIAGNOSIS, SHE SUSTAINED ACTUAL DAMAGES AND HAS AN
INCREASED RISK OF CANCER RECURRENCE.
A.

In A Motion To Dismiss, All Of Plaintiff s Allegations In Her Complaint Are

Deemed To Be True. On a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint under 12(b)(6), of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Complaint is entitled to the benefit of not only al 1 allegations in the
Complaint, but alsofromthe inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Ellis v. Social
Services of Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day-Saints 615 P. 2d 1250 (I Jtah 1980), Mounteer
v. Utah Power & Light Co. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). The allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint
are deemed to be true. Brown v. Weis 871 P.2d 552 (Utah 1994).
Plaintiff Has Pled That She Sustained Actual Damages And Has An
Increased Risk of Recurrence of Cancer As A Result of Defendants' Delay In Diagnosis.
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' delay in diagnosis that:
13.
On December 16,1998, the biopsies were carried out by
Dr. Hirsche. These revealed infiltrating ductile carcinoma at all
three sites. In late December of 1998. Ms. Medved underwent a
right mastectomy. Since the tumor involved eight lymph nodes, it
was also necessary to have the lymph nodes removed. She also
underwent chemotherapy and radiation therapy after the surgery.
t * #

17.
As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of
Dr. Glenn, Jamie Medved5 s diagnosis of her breast cancer was
delayed resulting in her having to undergo a mastectomy and
axillary node dissection, intensive chemotherapy and radiation
therapy and she remains at a very high risk of recurrence, has
endured pain and suffering, disfigurement loss of enjoyment of life
and, other general damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
3

18.
As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of
Dr. Glenn, Plaintiff has incurred medical expenses, and, will
undoubtedly incur future medical expenses and, other special
damages including, but not limited to loss of income and loss of
economic opportunities, in an amount to be proven at trial.
See also, paragraphs 22 and 23.
Defendants' statement of facts in their motion are unsupported by affidavit or deposition
and should be stricken. The only "facts" before the court on this motion are the allegations of
Plaintiffs Complaint which are assumed to be true and are entitled to all reasonable inferences to
the benefit of the Plaintiff. The sole issue is whether those allegations, assumed to be true, state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Since the allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint are deemed to be true, the issue is whether
the Defendants' failure to timely diagnose breast cancer which results in a right radical
mastectomy and produces an increased risk of the recurrence of cancer, states a claim for relief
under Utah law.
C.

Actual Damages In Conjunction With An Increased Risk of Cancer

Recurrence Is Sufficient To Sustain A Claim For Negligence. In addition to actual damages,
(radical mastectomy), Plaintiff has alleged that she has an increased risk of recurrence of cancer.
In George v. LDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990), the court recognized a claim for
loss of chance. It cited with approval James v. United States 483 F.Supp. 581, 585 (N.D.C.A.
1980):
"Evidence which shows a reasonable certainty that negligent delay
in diagnosis or treatment increased or lessened the effectiveness of
treatment is sufficient to establish proximate cause." Id. at 585.
4

The Court also approved Hicks v. United States 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) and its
conclusion that Defendant's "negligence nullified w hatever chance of recovery she might have
had and was the proximate cause of the death." Id. at 633, The court in George, supra, similarly
cited with approval Goffv. Doctors General Hospital of San Jose 333 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1958)
(where the "chance of saving a patient's life woi ilci have been increased if a physician had been
timely notified" and whether this negligence was a cause of death was a jury question.) Hamil v.
Bashline 392 A.2d 1280 (P. 1978) and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3231
In George, the Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the hospital. Following
a jury verdict in favor of the hospital, the Supreme Court reversed for new trial. The Court found
that a jury could have reasonably concluded that the hospital' s negligence prevented doctors
from treating and possibly saving patients' life but that the jury instructions prevented it from
meaningfully considering the expert testimony.
Under George v. LDS II^^HUL.

W

.

• .*. •
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to liability if his negligent

conduct increases the risk of harm, lessens the effectiveness of treatment or decreases a chance of
survival. Id. at 1117.
hiSeale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court conditioned
that right of recovery to cases where the Plaintiff presents proof of actual damages. It did not
abolish (he* claim lor enhanced nsk or OUTIIU'II flic nilin<> in - icorgc v LPS Hospital, supra,
Defendants cite, out of context, the following languagefromSeale: ...[A]n alleged claim for

lff

One who undertakes...to render services to another...is subject to liability...if (a) his
failure to exercise [reasonable] care increases the risk of such harm."

5

enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of action for negligence." (Defendants*
Memorandum in Support at p.4.) The complete quotation is, in fact:
Although we agree that the cancers spread resulted in a dramatic
decrease in Ms. Seale's chance of survival, we concluded that
without proof of actual damages, an alleged claim for enhanced
risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of action for negligence.
(Emphasis added.)
The Court discussed Colbert v. Georgetown Univ. 641 A.2d 469 (D.C. 1994), and Swain
v. Curry 595 So.2d 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1992), where risk of recurrence of cancer was approved,
as a basis of liability. The Utah Supreme Court found that:
In these cases [Colbert and Swain] the evidence showed
that the Plaintiffs had suffered actual damages in conjunction with
the increased risk of the cancers recurrence." Id. at 1366.
The Court distinguished those cases from Ms. Seale's who did not allege she had actual
damages as a result of the delay in diagnosis. Seale had a mastectomy and more extensive
surgery in 1988, but did not sue until 1991. She did not allege the 1988 actual damages
(mastectomy) in her 1991 suit because she was barred by the statute of limitations from such
assertion. She, therefore, sued only for the risk of recurrence of cancer.
The issue in Seale was whether that claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Ms.
Seale went to Dr. Gowans for a mammogram in August 1987. Dr. Go wans failed to detect a
cancerous mass in Ms. Seale's breast. The mass was not discovered until May, 1988. Ms. Seale
had a radical mastectomy a short time later. The pathology report of the removed tissue showed
that the cancer had spread to eight of Ms. Seale's twenty lymph nodes. Although Ms. Seale was
told that the finding of cancer in her lymph nodes increases the possibility that cancer wrould
6

recur in other parts of her body, Ms. Seale did not bring an action against Dr. Gowans at that
time.
Ms. Seale tested negative for cancer i iiiti Il < \ i igust 1991, when a bone scan showed cancer
in her hip. Ms. Seale then brought an action against Dr. Gowans for negligent delay in
diagnosing her cancer. Based on the jury's finding that Ms. Seale discovered or should have
discovered her injury in June 1988, when she was correctly diagnosed with breast cancer, the
trial court held that Ms. Scale's action was barred by the medical malpractice act's two-year
statute of limitations, I Jtah Code \ nil, § 78 1 :1 4 Ilie I Jtah Supreme Court: reversed, holding
that, under the particular facts of the case, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
cancer returned in Ms. Seale's hip.
Gowans argued that the i nji lry that triggered the i: i in ning of the statute of limitations
was the cancer's spread to Ms. Seale's lymph nodes, "which statistically increased the chance
that cancer would recur and thus decreased her chance of long-term survival." 923 P,2d at 1364
(footnote omitted). The court held that "damages in the form of an enhanced risk only are not
sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations." Id at 1365 (emphasis added). The
court * u->r the general rule that, i: intil a plaintiff suffers "actual harm • 3r damages, the limitations
period will not accrue." Id at 1364. The court emphasized that the defendant had the burden of
proving that the plaintiff had suffered some "actual harm or damages" before August 1989 and
concluded that the defendant had not met his burden:
[Defendants failed to prove that Ms. Seale suffered a legally
cognizable injury when she discovered that the cancer had spread
to her lymph nodes. The only evidence that defendants produced

7

regarding the harmful consequence of the cancer's spread was that
it increased the risk that the cancer would recur. They failed to
argue or produce evidence that in 1988, Ms. Seale could complain
of any actual present damages. Although we agree that the
cancer's spread resulted in a dramatic decrease in Ms. Seale's
chance of survival, we conclude that without proof of actual
damages, an alleged claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to
sustain a cause of action for negligence,...

Because the only evidence defendants presented at trial, and the
only evidence Ms. Seale could marshal, showed that Ms. Seale
could not have discovered any legally cognizable injury until 1991,
we find that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find that
Ms. Seale discovered her injury in 1988.
Id. at 1364-65, 1366 (emphasis added).
In other words, the holding in Seale was based upon the parties' arguments and the
evidence at trial that the only injury Ms. Seale suffered as a result of Dr. Gowans' negligence
before her cancer recurred in 1991 was the possibility that her cancer would recur. The court
found this a legally insufficient injury, absent some "actual harm or damages." See Id. at 1364.
See also Id. ("once some harm is manifest, the limitations period begins to run on all claims")
(emphasis added and citation omitted).
The Court did not rule or hold that Ms. Seale could not have sued in 1988 for actual
damages or that she could not recover for enhanced risk or loss of chance. The Court only held
that without actual damages, which were not alleged or sought, she could not have filed suit in
1988 for loss of chance.

8

By contrast, Mrs. Medved has alleged "actual harm or damages" resulting from
Defendants' negligence, as well as the enhanced risk that her cancer will recur. As previously
discussed, those
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Medved has alleged that, but for Defendants' negligence, she would not have required a modified
radical mastectomy, and she would not have undergone the cost of more extensive therapy,
which caused her pain, suffering and inconvenience.
TO THE EXTENT DEFENDANTS' MOTION IS DEEMED A MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT SHOULD ALSO BE DENIED.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the undisputed material facts demonstrate that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Territorial Sav, & Loan v. Baird 781
P.2d 452 (Utah 1989,) Since Defendants have not offered any affidavits, depositions,
interrogatories or admissions, the pleadings are the only thing before the court. If Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss is considered a Motion for Summary Judgment, (i.e., that as a matter of law,
Plaintiff is not entitled to reliefforher claim,) it should also be denied,
As a matter of law. Plaintiff has made a claim for relief which is legally cognizable.
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' delay in diagnosis, she underwent
more extensive surgery and treatment and has an increased risk of recurrence of cancer.
As discussed above, a Plaintiff who alleges she has sustained actual damages in

under Utah law. George v. LDS Hospital, supra., and Seale v. Gowans, supra. As a matter of
law, Plaintiff is entitled to relief for that claim.

9

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that she sustained actual damages as a result of Defendants'
delay in diagnosing her cancer. She is, therefore, entitled to all damages she has sustained,
including all foreseeable consequences and those within reasonable medical certainty, caused by
Defendants' negligence. Under Utah law, those consequences include the increased risk of harm
caused by Defendants.
Dated this 12~day of August, 2002.
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

tiff, Jamie Medved
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Cindy Disraeli, hereby certify that I have thisy^_th day of August, 2002, served the
foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE, to all interested parties to this matter by mailing a copy,
regular mail, properly addressed and with postage prepaid, to:
Counsel for Defendant; C. Joseph Glenn. M.D.
Curtis J. Drake
Snell & Wihner
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Counsel for Defendant: Blayne L. Hirsche. M.D.
Dennis C. Ferguson
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678

Cindy 1L. Disraeli
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WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D.
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Phone (801) 521-5678
Fax (801) 364-4500
CURTIS J, DRAKE
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Attorneys for Defendant C. Joseph <31efin, M.D.
15 W South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Phone (801) 257-1900
Fax (801) 257-1800
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STAT^OFUTAH

jMmtemzvw,

JOINT REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff;

C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D.
HIRSCHE, M.D.,

-:•

L.

Defendants.

Defendants submit this Joint Reply Memorandi.

J.(/H

^. , 1

Judge Fred D. Howard

,s

a Morion rn

Dismiss Without Prejudice. Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs Complaint under the
precedent established in Seale v. Gowahs, V2:i V.2d I ,\o \ \ I luh !'>%>, which holds that a
plaintiff attempting to assert a claim for negligent delay in diagnosis of breast cancer does
not have a cause of action unless or until she has a recurrence of cancer. In essence, Seale

holds that a plaintiff cannot assert a claim that her potential for developing a recurrence of
cancer is greater, or her chance of surviving reduced, because of a delay in diagnosis so
long as she remains cancer free. Seale holds that such a cause of action does not accrue
until such time, if ever, as the cancer recurs.
There is no dispute in this case that plaintiff, despite her alleged delay in diagnosis,
has not had a recurrence of cancer. In her opposition memorandum, plaintiff objects to
the statement of facts set forth by defendants in their principal supporting memorandum
and asserts that the Court must determine the merits of defendants5 motion based solely
upon the allegations of the Complaint. She argues that she has alleged in her complaint
that had her cancer been diagnosed sooner, she would have received different and less
invasive treatment and that she has, therefore, suffered actual damages. The statement of
facts presented by defendants in the principal memorandum, do not call into dispute this
allegation. While defendants have reason to dispute this assertion, they do not purport to
do so in the context of this motion nor do they believe that it is relevant to the legal issue
presented to the Court.
It also makes no difference whether this Court treats defendants' motion as a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or as a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56. The Court is entitled to consider evidence outside of the pleadings,
if appropriate, regardless of how defendants3 motion is styled. Rule 12(b)(6) makes
specific allowance for the Coxirt to consider evidence and simply treat a motion to dismiss
as a motion for summary judgment Frankly, the facts set forth in defendants5
memorandum are so basic and so incontrovertible that defendants did not anticipate
opposition to them. To ensure that the Court is able to place this case in proper context,
-2-

however, it is important to understand the basic sequence of medical facts. Therefore,
defendants reassert the eleven statements offeetset forth in their principal memorandum,
with citations to the record.

1.

Plaintiff first saw Dr. Glenn as a patient in 1991. (l^iintiffs deposition,

p. 20; see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant tx> Bide 2<S(a)).
2.

HaintiPs last visit with Dr (Menn was February 27* 1908'. (Malrittffs

depositions p. 112; see also, medical records produced by p(Iaintiff ^

to

Rule 26(a)),
3.

During tiie time pldxiMff tvas a patient of I>^ Glenn, she was diag^osod \vih

fibrocystic breast disease* (peposiioh of p l a i n t pp. 20,90: see also, medical rec^txis
pitodticed by p l a j ^
4.

Plaintifffirst saw IM iftrsche as a patient on July 13, 1998. (Plaintiffs

dfepdsitioii, p. 40; see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)).
5.

A mammogram, ordered by Dr. Hirsche and performed

1

revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally, no significant abnormality and no evidence
of miaMgnancy (£kintiffs deposition, p. 19; see also, medical records produced by
plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)).
6.

On August 12> 1998* Bn Hirsche performed bilateral breast augmentation

and aspiration of three siispected ri^ht breast cysts. (Maiiiiffs deposition, p. 43, see also,
all medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)).

001 fin

7.

On December 16, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of

three right breast nodules. (Deposition of plaintiff, p. 52; plaintiffs Complaint, H 13; see
also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)),
8.

The pathological examination associated with the December 16,1998,

excisional biopsy revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating ductal carcinoma.
(Plaintiffs deposition, p. 54; see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to
Rule 26(a)).
9.

On December 28, 1998, Steven J. Mintz, M.D. performed a right modified

radial mastectomy. (Plaintiffs deposition, p. 57; see also, medical records produced by
plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)).
10*

Plaintiff followed her surgical treatment with chemotherapy and radiation

therapy and later had surgical reconstruction. (Plaintiffs deposition, pp. 57, 58, and 121;
see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)).
11.

Plaintiff has not had a recurrence of her cancer. (Plaintiffs deposition,

pp. 60-61; see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS,
UTAH LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A LOSS OF
CHANCE CAUSE OF ACTION
In opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff contends that because her claim
includes actual, present damages in conjunction with claims for damages associated with an
increased risk of recurrence of cancer, she has stated a cognizable claim under Utah law.
In support of this argument, plaintiff cites George v. LPS Hospital. 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah
-4-

Ct App, 1990) and asserts that the George court recognized a claim for loss of chance.
VhiimS liext argues that the Utah Supreme Courts decision in Stale merely limited the
holding in George by requMi^ that a loss of chance claim be accompanied by a claim for
actual arid pifeseiit damages. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, George did not recognisje a
claim for loss of chaMe.
In George, a hospitalized patient died as a result of a sepsis-induced cardiac arrest.
The factual evidence presented at trial showed that hospital nur*

Te aware

a

patient's condition was deteriorating for a period of four hours prior to the cardiac arrest,
but failed to inform the patient's physicians of these s»"

TAVU :;

f

found

that, although the nurses3 failure to inform the physicians constituted negligence, it was
not a proximate cause of the patienfs deatl

, .1. *; ^

n. :> * in if;' ,t- ucd r * iurv

instructions improperly implied that there could only be one proximate cause of injury,
thereby preventing the jury from finding

!

; tributing

and proximate cause of the patient's death. The issue on appeal was one of negligence and
jpxximat^ cause and whether a negligent act which ^ - :\

• ••* •

injury biut is not

the sole cause of mjury, constitutes proximate cause. The Utah Court of Appeals, finding
that a jury could have reasonably concluded th:

-ses5 failvn

ify physicians of

the patient*s deteriorating condition was a proximate cause of her death, reversed and
remanded for a new"trial.- In its analysis, the George court found tlwt the facts presented
at trial supported the plaintiflPs position that the nurses3 negligence was a contributing
cause of the patienfs death. Inso doin^ tin MHIII rxplamcd ili.it., ii 1I111 nurses IILHI
notified physicians of the patienfs symptoms, they may have taken measures to treat the
sepsis before the patient arrested. Their fa i lure 'to act therefore, operated to reduce the
5-

patient's chances for recovery It is this characterization of the mechanism of causation
which is sometimes erroneously interpreted as establishing a loss of chance cause of action.
In George however, reduced chance of recovery and increased risk of harm are descriptions
of the contributing cause of injury not of the injury itself. The injury was deatli. Plaintiff
here seeks to establish that a decreased chance of recovery is itself an injury The holding
in George simply does not support plaintiffs argument.
In Anderson v Brigham Young University, 879 fi Supp. 1124 (D. Utah 1995), the
United States District Court had occasion to interpret George when it was presented in
essentially the same manner as plaintiff attempts to use it here. Andersen, a diversity
action, involved a medical malpractice claim brought by a BYU student against the BYU
McDonald Health Center. The plaintiff alleged that physicians at die health center failed
to timely diagnose his Hodgkitf Disease. He sought recovery for a reduced chance of
survival and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding that Utah law does not
recognize a loss of chance cause of action, the court granted BYLPs motion for summary
judgment on the claim for reduced chance for survival. In so doing the court addressed
George, which was cited by Andersen, and explained that it does not recognize a cause of
action for loss of chance.
The [George] court cited Hicks and other loss of chance cases
for the proposition that where the chances of saving a life
would be increased absent negligence or malpractice, a jury
could find such negligence or malpractice to be a proximate
cause of subsequent injury or death. George is distinguishable
from the facts in this case, however. In George, there was an
actual injury suffered because the patient died. George does not
purport to recognize or create a new cause of option for mere
reduction ofstatistical chancesfirsurvival
Anderson, 879 E Supp. at 1129. (Emphasis added.)
-6-

Plaintiff here also seeks recovery for a reduced chance of survival. As the Andersen
court explains however, the holding in George does not support such a claim. In George,
language regarding increased risk of harm and reduced chance of recovery is used to
describe a proximate cause of injury, not an injury in and of itself. While not binding on
this Court, the Andersen opinion provides a well-reasoned explanation of the Utah Court
of Appeals holding in George. In addition, Andersen provides an accurate description of
the status of Utah law with respea to the loss of chance doctrine. "This Court is satisfied
that Utah has not adopted a separate cause of action permitting recovery for the reduction
of a statistical chance of long-term survival." Andersen 879 E Supp. at 1130.
It is Seale and not George which, in circumstances almost identical to the instant
case, addressed the issue of whether Utah law permits recovery for a reduced chance of
survival. The Seale Court decided the issue byfindingthat Ms. Seale did not have an
actionable claim until the recurrence of her disease. ccMs. Seale could not have discovered
any legally cognizable injury until 1991 [when she was diagnosed with a recurrence of
cancer].» Seale 923 P.2d at 1366.
POINT n
PIAENTTFF FAILS TO DISTINGUISH HER
INJURIES FROM THOSE HELD TO BE LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT IN SEALE v, GOWANS.
The only facts necessary for the Court's determination of defendants5 motion are (1)
plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for alleged negligent delay in diagnosis of breast
cancer; and (2) since her treatment for the cancer she has had no recurrence. These facts
alone not only support, but mandate a motion to dismiss in favor of the defendants. The
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question before the Court is purely a question of law turning on the interpretation of the
Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996).
The essence of Seale is that no claim can be brought for a delay or failure to
diagnose cancer, until such time as the cancer recurs. It is that simple:
As a result, even though there exists a possibility even a
probability of future harm, it is not enough to sustain a claim,
and a plaintiff must wait until some harm manifests itself.
Seale, 923 E2d at 1364.
[W]e find that defendants failed to prove that Ms. Seale
suffered a legally cognizable injury when she discovered that
the cancer had spread to her lymph nodes.
&

As discussed hereafter, if Ms Seale's cancer had not recurred,
she could not have recovered for an enhanced risk of the
cancer's recurrence.
M. at 1366, n.2.
Plaintiffs opposition to the Motion to Dismiss is entirely based on an unsuccessful
attempt to distinguish this case from Seale v. Gowans. Plaintiff claims that her case is
unlike Seale in that Mrs. Medved has suffered actual present damages in the form of more
extensive surgery which would not have been necessary if the defendants had diagnosed
her cancer earlier.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish this casefromSeale is, however, without basis. In
fact, Ms. Seale had similar "actual" damages when she received the correct diagnosis and
subsequent treatment more than two years prior to commencement of her lawsuit. In
May 1988, approximately one year after Dr. Gowans's alleged failure to detect the breast
cancer, Ms. Seale obtained a correct diagnosis and underwent a radical mastectomy,
-8-

followed by radiation and hormone treatment. At the time of the surgery, it was also
discovered that she had developed a second malignant tumor and the cancer had spread to
eight of her lymph nodes. Seale, 923 P.2d at 1362.
In the present case, Mrs. Medved also had positive lymph nodes by the time her
cancer was diagnosed. In Seale, the Court noted evidence that ccwomen who have small
tumors with no positive nodes have a long-term survival rate in excess of 85, 90 percent.
When the nodes are involved, it drops significantly, to slightly under 50 percent and the
more lymph nodes that are involved, the higher the probabilities are that we're dealing
with systemic disease/3 Scale, at 1366, n.6. Plaintiffs situation is not different from
Ms. Seale's in any material respect.
The "actual" injuries alleged by Mrs. Medved are legally no different in nature than
those actual injuries suffered by Ms. Seale. Both women presented evidence that they had
undergone more extensive surgery and/or therapy than they would have had if the cancer
had been diagnosed earlier by the defendants5 physician.
In Seale, the very same argument now made by Mrs. Medved was, in fact,
presented to the Utah Supreme Court and rejected. Dr. Gowans argued in his Petition for
Rehearing that the record demonstrated that Ms. Seale had not only knowledge of injury
in the form of an increased risk of recurrence of cancer, but she also had knowledge of
"actual present damage" in the form of past radiation and hormone therapy - "additional
treatment that would not have been necessary had the cancer been detected earlier." See
Petition pp. 2-7, attached hereto as Ex. €CA'\ See Order, attached hereto as Ex. "B". The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, denying the Petition For Rehearing on October 2,
1996. The Utah Supreme Court plainly did not consider such damages sufficient to
-9-

support a claim in a case for failed or delayed diagnosis of cancer. This is because of the
basic policy premise of the Seale opinion.
Because there is no question that the same argument and facts were presented to
the Supreme Court in Seale, this Court is constrained to follow the controlling law and
outcome in that case. It is plainly the most recent controlling law direcdy on the issue
before this Court.
POINT m
SEALE REQUIRES THAT ALL PIAINTTFPS
CLAIMS ARE PRESERVED AND MAY BE
ASSERTED ONLY AT SUCH TIME AS THERE IS A
RECURRENCE OF CANCER.
The essence of plaintiffs argument is that Seale suggests that the one action rule
allows, her to maintain her claim for damages based on enhanced risk of future cancer as
long as she can identify any type of present injury such as having received more extensive
treatment. This argument turns Seale on its head, again ignoring both the underlying facts
in Seale and the basic premise of the Courts opinion.
The Supreme Court in Seale did state that the one action rule precludes splitting
causes of action and the filing of multiple lawsuits arising out of the same alleged wrongful
act. What plaintiff misses is the fact that the Court made a policy-based decision that the
one action rule should be applied to avoid the assertion of speculative claims and to
preserve all claims until such time as there is a recurrence of cancer. Only by such a ruling
could the Court assure that plaintiffs would not be forced tofilepremature lawsuits on the
chance of a recurrence of cancer, while still protecting plaintiffs from the argument that
awareness of speculative or minor injury would start the statute running and preclude a
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later claim when the recurrence manifested in real and substantial injury The Court
noted:
[M]any of these plaintiffs will be unable to produce the
necessary evidence to show that the future harm is more likely
to occur than not. Yet, if the harm, such as the recurrence of
cancer, later occurs, the plaintiff would be precluded from any
recovery for devastating injuries by reason of having acquired
an earlier claim for purely speculative ones. We believe that
the better approach is to wait until the potential harm
manifests itself, allowing for more certain proof and fewer
speculative lawsuits,
Seale. at 1366.
Seale poses problems for both plaintiffs and defendants in cancer diagnosis cases. A
plaintiff might argue that it is unfair to prevent her from a present recovery of existing
damages for having undergone more extensive surgery or cancer treatment. She is,
however, insulated from the running of the statute of limitations and assured that she will
not be without a remedy if the worst (recurrence of the cancer) occurs in the future. In
short, premature and relatively minor damage cases are precluded (or delayed) in favor of
preserving full rights to a remedy for the devastating and non-speculative damage cases.
A defendant physician might argue that the effect of Seale is unfair because it prevents the
running of the statute of limitations indefinitely, even where the plaintiff is aware Of a
misdiagnosis. The physician, however, is protected by Seale from speculative claims and
multiple lawsuits arisingfromthe Same treatment. The Utah Supreme Court balanced
these different interests Seale and made a sound decision that there shall be only one cause
of action in these cases and it will not accrue until such time as there is a recurrence of the
cancer. Plaintiff may not like this outcome now, but it affords her future protection in the
event the worst happens, and it is the controlling law in this State.
-11-

Plaintiff mistakenly relies on Swain v. Curry, 595 So.2d 168 (Ha. 1992).

The

defendants, who did not prevail in Seaie, also cited Swain in support of their argument.
The Supreme Court, expressly declined to follow Swain and rejected defendants5 argument.
Swain was distinguishable not only oil the facts, but also on the law. An important
consideration in Swain was the Florida statute of limitations for medical malpractice
claims, which commences to run when a patient knows of either a breach of the standard
of care or a physical injury. Swain, at 171 and n.4. Thus, in Swain the Florida court had
to be concerned with the possibility of the statute of limitations running to preclude a
misdiagnosis case even where there was no injury.1 The Court solved the problem by
allowing the patient to proceed with a claim for possible recurrence of cancer. In Utah,
the state Supreme Court is faced with a different statute of limitations standard which
requires knowledge of both the physical injury and the possibility that it was caused by
medical negligence before the statute will commence to run,2 The Utah Supreme Court
has thus been able to protect plaintiffs in delayed diagnosis of cancer cases by ruling that,
until there is a recurrence, there is no injury and the statute will not run.
Most importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the problem of the
statute of limitations and the one action rule in a way that provides far more protection to
1

In Seale. the Court also took note of another Florida case, Tohnson v. Mullee. 385
So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1980). In that case, however, the Florida Court of Appeal found under similar
circumstances that the plaintiff had no cause of action until there was a recurrence or metastatic
spread of the cancer. Notably, Tohnson was decided under an earlier version of Florida's statute of
limitations, one which was different from that considered in Swain.
2

In Utah, the two-year period for bringing a medical negligence claim "does not start to
run until the injured person knew or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that
the injury was caused by negligence." Seale. at 1363 (citing Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144,148
(Utah 1979).)
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plaintiflFs who ultimately suffer a recurrence, than the Florida Court did in Swain. Rather
than forcing plaintiffs into premature speculative lawsuits, losing the right to file an action
upon discovery of the ultimate injury, the Utah Supreme Court has, under its statute of
limitations, extended to plaintiffs the opportunity in every such case to wait and obtain full
compensation for the ultimate devastating injury. Seale v. Gowans is the controlling law
in this case and, as noted above, the facts are indistinguishable. Only one claim may be
brought for injuries arising from the alleged the delayed diagnosis of cancer, and regardless
of the existence of some actual injury in the form of more extensive therapy, the claim
cannot be brought until such time as there is a recurrence of cancer. In the meantime, the
plaintiff is protected, for the statute of limitations will not run.
CONCLUSION
Fortunately, Mrs. Medved has been in remission since completion of her therapy.
Although there is a statistical possibility or even probability of recurrence, that is
insufficient to sustain a claim. Plaintiff has failed to present any admissible evidence of a
legally cognizable present injury under Seale.
If this Court grants defendants5 motion to dismiss for the reason that no actionable
claim presently exists, plaintiff will have lost little. If she does suffer a future recurrence,
she will retain the right tofilea claim for full recovery at that time. Only if this Court
declines to follow Seale by refusing to grant a motion to dismiss, will plaintiff lose the
right to file a claim if her cancer ever recurs.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their
motion to dismiss.
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff-Appellant Beyerly Seale ("Ms. Seale") commenced this action
alleging medical negligence on the part of Don F. Gowans ("Dr. Gowans") foi failure to
detect Ms. Seale's breast cancer approximately one year prior to its diagnosis in May 1988.
The trial court denied Dr. Gowans' Motion for Summary Judgment on his statute of
limitation defense on grounds mat it was aquestion of fact for the jury as to when the statute
of limitation began to run. The jury concluded the statute of limitation began to run in June,
1988, thus rendering Ms. Seale's action time barred—it not having been commenced until
more than two years after June, 1988.
Ms. Seale appealed me trial court's denial of her Motion for JNOV. On
August 2,1996, mis Court filed its opinion reversing the denial of Ms. Seale's Motion for
JNOV on grounds mat mere was insufficient evidence to uphold the jury's verdict. Ssatex.
Gonans, No. 940599, slip op. (Utah, filed August 2,1996). (A copy of the Court's August
2,1996 opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A,)
ISSUE ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Dr. Gowans seeks rehearing on the Court's conclusion that defendants
presented no evidence mat in June, 1988 Ms. Seale could complain of actual present damage
necessary to trigger the running of me statute of limitation. Grounds for the petition are mat
substantial evidence in me record establishes mat in June, 1988 Ms. Seale knew or should
have known that the spread of her cancer to her lymphatic system and its "spreading" or
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"invasive" character in the breast caused additional treatment that would not have been
necessary bad the cancer been detected earlier.'

(The pages from the Trial Transcript

comainingthis evidence are attached as Addendum B.)
ARGUMENT
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
THAT MS. SEALE KNEW OF SHOULD HAVE KNOWN
IN JUNE 1988 THAT DR. GOWANS' ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE
CAUSED DAMAGE IN THE FORM OF ADDITIONAL
MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. Factual Background
In August, 1987. Ms. Seale had a mammogram done at Holy Cross Hospital
Breast Care Center ("Holy Cross") which was interpreted as normal by Dr. Gowans. In
May, 1988, Ms. Seale had another mammogram done at Holy Cross which was interpreted
as being suspicious of cancer. That same day, a needle biopsy confirmed that Ms. Seale had
breast cancer.
On June 1,1988, Ms. Seale underwent surgery which included the removal of
breast tissue and lymph node tissue under the arm. The pathology report on tissue submitted
for analysis following surgery showed the cancer had spread throughout the breast and away
from me breast to the lymphatic system. A second tumor was also diagnosed which had not
been previously detected. As a consequence of the delayed diagnosis of her cancer, its
-Dr. Gowans does not seek rehearing on the Court's legal conclusion mat damages
in the form of enhancedriskonly are insufficient to start the running of the statute of
limitation.
3

"spreading" or "invasive*' character in me breast and the spread to the lymphatic system. Ms.
Seale was required to undergo additional treatment-radiation therapy and hormonal therapy.
This constitutes damage.
Dr. Gowans claimed, and the-jury concluded, that by June. 1988. Ms. Seale
knew or should have known of Dr. Gowans' alleged negligent failure to diagnose her cancer
and that this delay caused her damage-triggering the running of the statute of limitation.
On appeal mis Court found mere was sufficient evidence to show that in 1988
Ms. Seale knew or should have known that Dr. Gowans had negligently failed to diagnose
her cancer in 1987 and that in 1988 Ms. Seale knew her cancer had spread to her lymph
nodes. The court found also mat the spread of Ms. Scale's cancer decreased the chance of
her survival and increased the probability the cancer had spread to other areas of her body.
Scale v, Gowans, No. 940599, slip op at 2,5-7. The record is replete with evidence that by
June 1988 Ms. Seale was aware of all mis information. (R. 1052-1054,1069-1070,1090,
1097-1098,1106,1061-1063,1086-1087,1090.)
However, the Court held mat the fact that the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer
decreased her chance of survival to below 50 percent and increased ihe probability the cancer
had spread to other areas of the body did not constitute a legally cognizable injury to trigger
the running of the statute of limitation. The rale adopted by me Court is that without proof
of actual damages, a claim for enhancedriskis not adequate to sustain a cause of action for
negligence.. Seale v. Gowans. No. 940599, slip op at 7. The Court made dear, however, that
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"once some harm is manifest, the limitations period begins toranon all claims, present and
future/* Id. at 6.
In concluding there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, the
Court found that defendants failed to produce evidence that Ms. Seale suffered any actual
present damage because of the cancer's spread to her lymphatic system. Rowans v. £gak.
No. 940599, slip op at 6-7. However, there is substantial evidence in the record that Ms.
Seale suffered actual present damages in June, 1988. Plaintiif had the obligation to marshall
this evidence and failed to do so. Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). The
evidence is that in June, 1988, Ms. Seale knew or should have known that her cancer had an
"invasive" or "spreading'" nature in the breast and had spread to her lymphatic system and
that because of this, she would need additional and more extensive treatment than would
have been necessary bad the cancer been diagnosed before the spread.
Set forth below is the substantial evidence supporting the verdict that Ms, Seale
knew or should have known in June, 1988 that she suffered actual present damage,.

-A possible explanation for the Court overlooking the evidence that by June, 1988,
Ms. Seale had suffered actual damage is the Court's apparent belief that "[defendants"'
contend that the evidence produced at trial shows that in May, 1988, Ms. Seale had
discovered or should have discovered both Dr. Gowans' negligence in failing to detect
her cancer and the injury that resulted from that negligence." Seale v Gowans at 5.
However, it has never been Dr. Gowans' contention that in May, 1988 Seale had
discovered injury resultingfromnegligence. Dr. Gowans has always aTSMed that bv June.
1988. aftfTfhe diagnosis of the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer yp her lymphatic system, and
tfa cancer's mvasive nature, which necessitated additional treatment, Ms. Seale knew or
should have known of her legal injury.
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Dr. Hogle testified that the type and scope of treatment to be employed in
treating breast cancer depends upon whether the cancer is localized to the breast regional**
involved in the breast and lymph nodes, or systemic-meaning the cancer has gone beyond
the breast and lymph nodes to the bones, lungs, or someplace else in the body. (R. 10481049,1074-10750. Dr. Hogle met with Ms. Seale on two occasions between May 27,1988
and June 1, 1988 and discussed with her the biology of breast cancer and the treatment
options usedto treat it, (R. 1050-10590 Ms. Seale testified that she knew as early as 1985
that delay in diagnosis of cancer had an effect on the treatment of cancer, (R. 12290
Dr. Hogle testified there are two different sets of treatment. The first set is
what is refored to as "primary" therapy and involves a choice between two surgical
procedures: (1) lumpectomy, called breast conservation therapy, or (2) modified radical
mastectomy. Where, however, cancer is no longer localized, that is, has spread to the lymph
nodes, fhpn "secondary" treatment,frequentlyrefened to as "adjuvant therapy* is necessary.
Adjuvant therapy includes chemotherapy or hormonal treatments and on occasion radiation
therapy in addition to the mastectomy.3 The adjuvant therapy becomes necessary because
the spread to the lymphatic System creates a significant probability the cancer has spread to
other areas of the body. (R. 1048-1049. 1061-1063,1O86408Z)
In June, 1988, following surgery, Dr. Hogle told Ms. Seale her cancer had
spread beyond the breast and into the lymphatic system and that the spread significantly
*~*-******mmmmm^mmmm^mmmmtmmmmmmmmmwarnmmmmm

'Radiation therapy is usually employed as part of the lumpectomy or breast
conservation primary therapy.
6

reduced her prognosis for a successful cure and increased the likelihood the cancer had
spread to omer areas of the body. (R- 106M063,1086-1087.1090.) Dr. Hogle testified that
the finding in June, 1988 of the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer to her lymphatic system and
its invasive nature caused the need for additional treatment-adjuvant thcrapy-and that in
June, 1988, he informed Ms. Seale of mis fact and recommended additional therapy. Dr.
Hogle recommended radiation therapy and referred Ms. Seale to Dr, John Thompson' for this
therapy; also he recommended chemotherapy or hormonal therapy and referred her to Dr.
James Cecil for this therapy. (R. 1059,1062.1065s 1199-1201.) Dr. Hogle testified:
0
Did vmi_ because of thefindingsatffietime of surgery.
including the spread to the Ivmnhafic system and the invasive
nature of the tumof.-make some recommendations to Ms. Seale
about additional cancer therapy that vonfeltwould he appropri-

ate to consider?
A

Yes.ar, Idid.
*•#*

Q
...[You], told her matfindingsof the metastasis spread to
the lymph nodes and of the invasive nature of the cancer within
the breast itself?

A

Yes, that it triggered the need for additional Treatment,

(emphasis added)

(R. 1063-1064.) Consequently, Ms. Seale underwent daily radiation treatment for five to
seven weeks and underwent hormonal therapy-the taking of tamoxifen at least once per day
for more man three years. (R, 11 KM 112» 120M203.)

7

Accordingly, the record establishes that in June. 1988. Ms. Seale knew or
should haw known:
(1)

matjearly diagnosis of cancer is better than late diagnosis:

(2)

thatfiledelay in diagnosis of cancer increases the probability that cancer

has spread and that such-delay affects the treatment of cancer;
(3)

that Dr. Gowans failed to diagnose her cancer approximately one year

before it was diagnosed;
(4)

that by the time me cancer was diagnosed in 1988 it had an "invasive"

or "spreading" nature in the breast and had spread to her lymphatic system; and
(5)

that because Of the nature of the cancer and its spread she had to

midCTPO additional and more extensive treatment thaw wonld have been necessary had the
cancer been diagnosed earlier4
The additional treatment caused by the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer is actual
present damage known to Ms. Seale which triggered the running of the statute of limitation
in June, 1988.
B. Legal Application of Facts
The position of Dr. GovTans is supported by the case law cited by the Court in
its decision. Swain v, Curry, 595 So. 2d 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1992 V review denied. 601 So.
2d 5S1 (Ha. 1992); rolhert v. Georgetown Umv.T 641 A. 2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1994) <en banc).
'The failure of Ms. Seale to "marshal!" this evidence in support of the jury verdict
is a substantial factor in it being overlooked by the Court in its opinion.
8

The Court incorrectly concluded these cases were distinguishable because the evidence
therein showed the plaintiffs had suffered actual damage in conjunction with the increased
risk of the cancer's reoccurrence. In light of the uncontradicted evidence in the record that
Ms. Seale knew she was required to undergo more treatment than would have been required
had the cancer been diagnosed before its spread, these cases are directly on point.
In Swayi v riirryT plaintiffs alleged Dr. Curry failed to detect Swain's breast
cancer approximately one year before it was diagnosed by another physician. Swain argued
tne delay in diagnosis caused present damage even though at the time of the opinion Ms.
Swain had no clinical evidence of recurrence of cancer. Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the
delay in diagnosis affected treatment modalities for her cancer and that if the cancer had been
diagnosed earlier she would not have received chemotherapy and would have undergone a
lumpectomy with radiation as opposed to a mastectomy. Swain v. Curry. 595 So. 2d at 169170.
In reversing summary judgment in favor of Dr. Curry, the Florida Court of
Appeals held mat Swain had presented evidence that her treatment and related damages
would have been different had the cancer been diagnosed earlier. Therefore, Swain had a
cause of action for additional physical-damages as a result of the claimed delayed diagnosis
against which the statute of limitation began to run. Id
In Oribcrt v Georgetown Tfaivr plaintiff alleged defendant physician
negligently treated Susan Colbert's cancer. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendant physician holding that Susan
9
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Colbert sustained "appreciatable and actual harm" sufficient to trigger the running of the
statute of limitation when she sustained damages incident to treatment and therapy, such as
radiation and chemotherapy, allegedly necessary because of the negligent treatment of her
cancer. CpIbeH-V, GCQTgetOWl Univ., 641 A. 2d at 473-475.
This Court's conclusion that the evidence showed that Ms. Scale could not
have discovered any legally cognizable injury until 1991 when she discovered die cancer had
spread to her hip is incorrect The damage MB. Seale became aware of in 1991 is the same
damage she was aware of in June, 1988. What Ms. Scale knew in 1991 was that the cancer
had spread to her hip which required additional radiation therapy and, consequently, damage
resulted therefrom. What Ms. Seale knew in June, 1988' was that the cancer had an invasive
component and had spread to her lymphatic system and that consequently she suffered
damage in die form of radiation and hormonal treatment die would not have had to' undergo
had the cancer been diagnosed earlier.
Ms. Seale knew no more about whether the delayed diagnosis of her cancer
caused her damage in 1991 than she knew in 1988. Dr. Hogle testified there is no way to tell
precisely when Ms. Seale's cancer spreadfromher breast and into the vascular system which
spread manifested itself in her hip in 199L Dr. Hogle stated:
Q
As we sit here today, is there any way to tell precisely in
Ms. Seale's case when the cancer metastasized or spread from
her breast into the vascular system and it's now shown up in her
hip?
A

No. There is not.
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(R. 1068.) Ms. Seale acknowledged Dr. Hogle informed her that her cancerous tumor had
been in her body for a mimroum often years. (R. 1227.) The spread of Ms. Seale's cancer
into her vascular system could have occurred prior to 1987 when Dr. Oowans faHed to detect
the cancer-there is simply no way to tell precisely when the spread occurred.
C Statutes of Limitation
Finally, statutes of limitation are by design indiscriminant in their application
and often harsh in their result. Whether this is wise or unwise, just or unjust is, admittedly,
subject to debate~but not within this case. The two year statute of limitation in U.C-A. § 7814-4 is the law to be applied. The trial court following case lawfrommis Court concluded
that when Ms. Seale knew or should have known of her legal injury was a question of fact.
After being properly instructed on the applicable law, s the jury having considered this
evidence (and knowing the legal effect of their verdict) found that Ms. Seale knew or should
have known of her legal injury in June, 1988. (R. 715; see Special Verdict Form attached
hereto as Addendum C.) The trial court in denying Ms. Seale's JNOV motion held that
"there is competent evidence sufficient to support the verdict" (R. 830-831.) Substantial
and uncontradicted evidence supports this verdict and it should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
This Court has overlooked die substantial and uncontradicted evidence which
establishes mat in June, 1988, Ms. Seale was aware of Dr. Gowans* alleged negligence and

'Scale v frowns No. 940599, slip op at 4n5.
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that this conduct caused her actual damage in the form of additional medical treatment in
addition to the increasedriskof future harm.
The Petition for Rehearing should be granted,
RULE 35(a) CERTIFICATION
Counsel for Petitioner, J. Anthony Eyre and Kirk G. Gibbs, certify that this
Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED THIS 1 6 ^ day of August. 1996.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

LKXJ^
[QNYEYRE,
G. GIBBS, ESQ.IAttorneys for Appellee^
Don F. Gowans, M.D.

12

MA1UNG CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that cm thc,^? day of August 1996.1 caused two true
and correct copies of tht foregoing Petition for Rehearing of Appellee, Don F. Gowam,
MLD., be mailed, postage prepaid, to die following:
Fred R. Silvester
SILVESTER &. CONROY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
230 South 5th East, Suite 590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84J02
David W. Slagel
Terence L. Rooney
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Holy Cross Hospital
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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Cross Hospital, dba Holy Cross
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The petition for rehearing1 is denied.

Geoffrey J. Butler
Cleric
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Michael F. Richman [#4180]
James W.Gilson [#1170]
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5664 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 266-0999
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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]

JAMIE MEDVED,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CERTIFIED COPY OF COMPLAINT
IN SEALE v. GOWANS

]

C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D. AND BLAYNE ;|
L. HIRSCHE, M.D.
]i
Defendants.

]i

Case No.: 010400960
Division: 9
Judge: Lynn W. Davis

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Plaintiff moves the Court to take judicial notice of the Complaint filed in Seale v.
Gowans, Third District Court Civil No. 910907957 PI, dated December 17,1991.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2002.
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

1

I CERTIFY TH/W TJ
ORIGINAL OOCOMJ
DISTRICT COUR7.
OF U T A H . . ,
DATE-
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DEPUTY

Fred R. Silvester, Esq. #3862
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BEVERLY SEALE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DON F. GOWANS, M.D., and
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL, doing
business as HOLY CROSS BREAST
CENTER and HOLY CROSS BREAST
CARE SERVICES,

COMPLAINT
(Demand for Jury Trial)

civn NO. f/tffjyty?
Hon

/i

JUDGE RICHARD H. UCrrnf

Defendants.
Plaintiff complains of defendants as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

2.

At all relevant times, defendant Don F. Gowans, M.D.

("Dr. Gowans") was a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, and was
duly licensed to practice medicine under the laws of Utah.
3.

At all relevant times defendant Holy Cross Hospital

doing business as Holy Cross Breast Center and Holy Cross Breast
Care Services is a Utah healthcare corporation engaged in the
business of providing medical care and treatment.

«> a A i» r« v

4.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to Utah Code § 78-3-4 (1988).

The controverted amount exceeds

$10,000.00, exclusive of attorneys' fees and costs.
5.

This Court has personal jurisdiction and venue. The

parties reside in Salt Lake County and the acts of defendants in
this lawsuit occurred in Salt Lake County.
CAUSE OF ACTION
6.

Beginning in 1985 and continuing through 1991,

plaintiff was under the care of Holy Care Breast Care Center, now
known

as Holy Cross Breast Care Services and, among

others

physicians, Dr. Gowans. As such, Holy Cross and Dr. Gowans owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff to diagnose and report disease,
including cancer, of plaintiff's breasts.
7.

On May 27, 1988, Holy Cross diagnosed plaintiff as

having cancer of her left breast.
8.

Defendants breached their duty of care to the

plaintiff from August 12, 1987 through May 27, 1988, by failing to
diagnose plaintiff's breast cancer.
9.

Defendants failure to promptly diagnose plaintiff's

breast cancer has directly and proximately caused plaintiff's
outcome from the cancer to be less favorable and her likelihood of
recovery from the cancer less likely, all causing plaintiff special
and general damages in amounts to be established at trial.

o o o ' ) o;,

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment in her favor and
against the defendants for special and general damages; for her
costs incurred herein and for such additional relief as the Court
deems appropriate under the circumstances.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues presented
by this Complaint pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
DATED this 17th day of December, 1991.

FfeS R. Silvesterf Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiff's Address:
1614 South 1400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84105
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I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
BEVERLY SEALE

DON F. GOWANS, M.D., and HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL,
doing business as HOLY CROSS BPEAST CENTER and
HOLY CROSS BREAST CARE SERVICES

(b) A T T O R N E Y S (Attorney name, Bar #,
Address & Telephone #)
Fred R. Silvester, Esq. 3862

ATTORNEY (If known)

Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson
175 South West Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 532-7300

II. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in appropriate category)
DOMESTIC

CIVIL

DA Divorce/Annulment

AA Administrative Agency

SM Separate Maintenance

AP Appeal

PA Paternity

CV Other Civil

SA Spouse Abuse

CN Contract

UR URESA Action

CS Custody and Support
HC Writ-Habeas Corpus

PROBATE

PD Property Damage

ES Estate

PI

GC Guardian/Conservator

PR Property Rights (Real)

Personal Injury

NC Name Change
OT Other Probate

MISCELLANEOUS
MI Miscellaneous

ABSTRACTS
AJ Abstract of Judgment
TL Tax Lien

MENTAL HEALTH
MH Mental Health

ADOPTIONS
AD Adoption
III. JURY DEMAND:
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( ) NO
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Estate of Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D.
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Phone: (801) 521-5678
Fax: (801) 364-4500

CARMA 8. SMiTH, Clerk
^Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

JAMIE MEDVED,
Plaintiff,
v.
C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D. and ESTATE
OF BLAYNE L. HIRSCHE, M.D.,

Civil No. 010400960
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 2, 2002, defendants C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. and Blayne L. Hirsche. M.D.
filed Defendants' Joint Motion for Dismissal Without Prejudice with a Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Dismissal Without
Prejudice.
Plaintiff Jamie Medved filed Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for
Dismissal Without Prejudice on August 14, 2002.

Defendants filed their Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Dismissal Without Prejudice on September 13, 2002.
On September 24, 2002, defendants filed a Notice to Submit and a Request for Oral
Argument.
On November 20, 2002, oral arguments were heard by the Court.
The Court took the matter under advisement at that time.
On November 26, 2002, the Court was informed by an article in the Provo Daily
Herald that Dr. Blayne L. Hirsche and his wife were killed in a plane accident. The Court
informed the parties that any claim against Dr. Hirsche would have to be filed against his
estate.
Plaintiffs Motion for Substitution pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure was filed on December 10, 2002. The Motion requested that the Estate of
Blayne L. Hirsche be substituted in the place and stead of Dr. Blayne L. Hirsche. The Court
has now executed an Order substituting "The Estate of Blayne L. Hirsche" as defendant.
FACTS
The following facts are admitted by the parties or not in material dispute:
1.

Plaintiff first saw Dr. Glenn as a patient in 1991.

2.

Plaintiffs last visit with Dr. Glenn was February 27, 1998.

3.

During the time plaintiff was Dr. Glenn's patient, she was diagnosed with

fibrocystic breast disease.
4.

Plaintiff first saw Dr. Hirsche as a patient on July 13, 1998.

5.

A mammogram, ordered by Dr. Hirsche and performed on July 20, 1998,

revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally.

6.

On August 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed bilateral breast augmentation and

aspiration of three suspected right breast cysts.
7.

On December 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of three

right breast nodules.
8.

The pathological examination associated with the December 12, 1998,

excisional biopsy revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating ductal carcinoma.
9.

On December 28, 1998, Steven J. Mintz, M.D. performed a right modified

radical mastectomy.
10.

Plaintiff followed her surgical treatment with chemotherapy and radiation

therapy and later had surgical reconstruction.
11.

Plaintiff has not had a recurrence of her cancer.
ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Rule 52(a), the Court provides the following statement of the grounds for
its decision.
In their Motion for Dismissal Without Prejudice, defendants assert that plaintiff fails
to establish a legally recognizable claim. They assert that Utah law does not recognize a
cause of action for loss of chance or enhanced risk. In citing Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d
1361 (Utah 1996), defendants claim that plaintiff does not have a cause of action until she
has shown actual harm and not simply an increased risk of harm. In this case, such actual
harm would be evident in the recurrence of cancer. Defendants contend that because plaintiff
has not suffered a recurrence of cancer, she cannot claim damages.

Plaintiff responds to these arguments by asserting that Utah law has recognized that
liability may be imposed where negligence increases a party's risk of harm. George v, LPS
Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990). Plaintiff further asserts she sustained actual
damages in addition to facing a greater risk of cancer recurrence. Namely, plaintiff asserts
that due to defendants' negligent diagnosis, she underwent more extensive treatment and
surgery including a radical mastectomy. Accordingly, plaintiff claims she has met the
requirement of actual injury found in Seale v. Go wans.
In analyzing the claims of each of the parties, the Court finds itself in a difficult
position. The Court is sympathetic to plaintiffs claims and is reluctant to limit her potential
remedies. However, the Court is convinced that overly speculative claims are not allowed
under Utah law. The Court finds Utah law has only recognized liability based on increased
risk in narrow circumstances where the increased risk can be analyzed in the context of an
injury related to the risk alleged.
For instance, in George v. LPS Hospital the Utah Court of Appeals examined a case
where attending nurses failed to inform treating physicians of a patient's failing health. After
the patient's health slipped for some time, the physicians were notified of the situation.
Shortly thereafter, the patient died. The plaintiff in George asserted that as a result of the
nurses' actions, the physicians were unable to perform various treatments that may have
improved the patient's health. In the context of this set of facts, the Court of Appeals stated,
"[e]vidence which shows a reasonable certainty that negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment
increased the need for or lessened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to establish
proximate cause." Id at 1121 (quoting James v. United States, 483 F.Supp. 581, 585
(N.D.C.A. 1980).

This Court notes that in George, the finder of fact could determine issues of causation
and damages in the context of an actual injury related to the increased risk. In other words,
the risk of not recovering could be measured from the perspective that the patient had indeed
died. The cases from other jurisdictions cited in George also involved an increased risk
analysis in the context of an injury related to the risk alleged. For example, in Hicks v.
United States, 368 F.2d 626 <4th Cir. 1966) and Goff v. Doctors General Hospital of San
Jose, 333 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1958) the patient at issue in the malpractice action had died.
Seale v. Go wans reaffirms this understanding of the law. In Seale, the plaintiff
claimed that a late diagnosis of breast cancer placed her at an increased risk of cancer. The
main issue presented in Seale involved the application of the statute of limitations. The
defendants asserted that the statute of limitations started to run in 1988 when Ms. Seale
discovered that cancer had spread to her lymph nodes—an indication that Ms. Seale's chances
of disease free survival were dramatically reduced. The Court disagreed. The Court found
the statute of limitations began to run in 1991 when Ms. Seale discovered cancer had spread
to her hip despite her mastectomy and other remedial measures. In explaining this decision,
the Seale Court discussed the dangers of a scheme which would force a plaintiff to file a
complaint asserting possible or probable future harm in order to avoid the running of the
statute of limitations. The Court stated:
[P]laintiffs who are not exhibiting any actual, physical harm . . .
would be forced to bring an action for injuries that may or may
not occur in the future. However, many of these plaintiffs will
be unable to produce the necessary evidence to show that the
future harm is more likely to occur than not. Yet if the harm,
such as the recurrence of cancer, actually later occurs, the
plaintiff would be precluded from any recovery for devastating
injuries by reason of having acquired an earlier claim for purely
speculative ones. We believe that the better approach is to wait

until the potential harm manifests itself, allowing for more
certain proof and fewer speculative lawsuits.
Id. at 1366
In the present case, the plaintiff has claimed an increased risk of cancer recurrence.
She has not, however, claimed the injury related to that increased risk—the actual recurrence
of cancer. Instead, plaintiff has claimed that she had to undergo more extensive treatment.
The Court is unconvinced this injury is sufficiently related to the risk alleged. It appears to
be an independent result of the alleged malpractice. The injury in no way helps the court
identify issues of causation or damages associated with the increased risk. Nor does the
injury help curtail speculation as to some yet unrealized harm.
The lack of an injury clearly related to the increased risk is very problematic and
troubling to the Court. On the most practical level, the Court cannot conceive how jury
instructions for damages on the claim could be presented without asking jurors to speculate
on what may or may not occur in the future. Such broad speculation has not been approved
by Utah courts.
Utah law has not recognized claims of increased risk in the absence of a related
injury. Plaintiff has claimed an increased risk of cancer recurrence, but has not claimed an
injury clearly related to that risk. Accordingly, the Court finds no legally recognized claim
and hereby ORDERS that plaintiffs legal action and claims against defendants be and the
same are hereby dismissed without prejudice. Each of the parties shall bear her, tiis or its
respective costs and attorney's fees.

DATED this / ^

day of March, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

%Z&?0i
W. Davis

Approved as to Form:

Anne D. Armstrong
Counsel for Defendant C. Joseph Glenn, M.D.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Beverly Purswell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Estate of Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D., defendant herein; that
she served tht proposed attached ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE in Civil No. 010400960 before the
Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, upon die parties listed
below by placing a true and correct copy diereof in an envelope addressed to:
Counsel for Plaintiff
Michael F. Richman
James W Gilson
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5664 S. Green Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
Counsel for Defendant C. Joseph Glenn, M.D.
Curtis J. Drake
Anne D. Armstrong
SNELL&WILMER
15 W South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 13th day of
March, 2003.

Beverly Purswqg)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 13th day of March, 2003.

NOTARY PUBLIC
DANETTEA.LYON
257 East 200 South Ste 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES
September 11, 2006
STATE OFUTAH

